We carry out a randomized controlled experiment in West Bengal, India to test three separate performance pay treatments in the public health sector. Performance is judged on improvements in child malnutrition. First, we exogenously change wages of government employed child care workers through a basic level of absolute incentives. The second treatment introduces high absolute incentives. Finally, we also test for the impact of basic relative incentives on child health. All treatments include supplying mothers with recipe books. Overall, the results suggest that high absolute incentives reduce severe malnutrition by about 6.3% with controls and 4.9% without controls over three
Introduction
Performance pay is often taken to mean piece rates where a payout is linked to only individual productivity or output. However, relative performance pay schemes (especially tournaments) are also widespread in organizations. In this study, we carry out a randomized experiment to compare absolute with relative performance pay in a public sector organization engaged in service delivery. The incentives are provided to child care workers to lower child malnutrition. We also test for the gradient of the absolute performance pay scheme in this experiment.
There are 1.31 million child day care centers in India under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) government-sponsored program. 1 Each center is sta¤ed by a child care worker who is responsible for supervising children between ages 3-6 years during day-time, providing them mid-day meals, teaching mothers about child nutrition, imparting non-formal pre-school education and facilitating health check-ups by doctors. 2 They are typically on …xed wages. The centers are widespread across India and admission is free. Nevertheless, quality of service delivery has often come under scrutiny (see 1 Between 2007-2012, the value of the funds allocated by the central government to the Integrated Child Development Scheme was $7.4 billion (Lok Sabha, 2012) . 2 Centers also act as food distribution centers for pregnant women, adolescent girls and children under the age of three years.
for example, Chaudhury et al. (2006) on health worker absenteeism and Das and Hammer (2005) on quality of doctors in India). A recent household survey in 100 Indian districts reveals that 96 percent of the villages are served by these centers, although only 50 percent provide food on the day of survey and 19 percent of the mothers report that the center worker provides nutrition counselling (HUNGaMA report, 2011). A study on Bihar's day care centers found that 71 percent of the funds received by centers for the mid-day meal component were not spent on the bene…ciaries and the performance of the programme should be monitored using outcome data rather than inputs (IGC report, 2013) . Moreover, despite a high rate of economic growth in the past two decades, stunting in India is still higher than Sub-Saharan Africa and Jayachandran and Pande (2013) …nd a steep increase in stunting for higher birth order children in India.
One way of tackling the supply-side ine¢ ciency can be through performancebased incentives. Performance pay has been shown to have a positive e¤ect on productivity of workers in the public sector under certain conditions (Singh, 2012; Basinga et al. 2011 ) even though there could be crowding out of intrinsic motivation if incentives are too low (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) . In Singh (2012) , absolute performance pay to workers improves worker e¤ort but child malnutrition only decreases when performance incentives are combined with information to the demand-side (recipe books given to mothers of children in day-care centers). In particular, the results from this experiment conducted in Chandigarh provided evidence for the complementarity between supply-side incentives and demand-side information in a¤ecting child health. 3 However, it was not able to address how performance is af- 3 In an experiment covering 145 child day-care centers, Singh (2012) implements three separate treatments. First, he engineers an exogenous change in compensation for childcare workers from …xed wages to performance pay. Second, he only provides mothers with information without incentivizing the workers. Third, he combines the …rst two treatments. Combining incentives to workers and information to mothers reduces weight-forage malnutrition by 4.2% in three months. This complementarity is shown to be driven by more e¤ective mother-worker communication and the mother feeding more calori…c food fected by a change in slope of absolute performance pay. This may be useful to know for policy-makers to have a better idea of the cost-e¤ectiveness of such schemes. Secondly, there was no comparison of absolute pay with respect to relative pay, which may be more e¤ective for public sector workers. Both these questions are addressed in the present experiment conducted in a di¤erent region of India -West Bengal in Maheshtala Municipality on the outskirts of Kolkata. As of December 2011, the percentage of malnourished children under 5 in West Bengal, in terms of weight-for-age, was 38.7%, below the national …gure of 42.5% (Rajya Sabha, 2011) . Exogenous treatments were assigned through cluster randomization contemporaneously along with a pure control group. All centers were based entirely within one geographic block and there was no endogenous selection into the treatment.
There has been very little experimental research on performance incentives in health programs of low and middle-income developing countries according to an excellent literature review by Miller and Babiarz (2013) . An exception in providing incentives on the demand-side is Banerjee, Kothari and Du ‡o (2010) who incentivize immunization coverage in rural Rajasthan for mothers and …nd large increases in uptake. Manning, Hasnain and Pierskalla (2012) review the experimental evidence on performance pay in the public sector and conclude that it is extremely scarce, especially in developing countries. 4 The only two studies they cite in this sub-…eld are Basinga et al. (2011) 4 Christianson et al. (2008) make the same point about developed countries stating that control groups are often not comparable. One of the …rst experimental papers on performance incentives for nursing homes in US found that incentives lead to better resident health outcomes and shorter stays (Norton 1992 ). Figlio and Kenny (2007) …nd that merit pay for teachers matters and more so for parents who are more involved.
on child health outcomes in Rwanda. It is rare to implement performance incentives for service delivery in the public sector and also have a control group. Moreover, comparing relative and absolute incentive schemes as well as changing the gradient of the incentive pay have never been studied in the public health domain. Finally, there may be multitasking or gaming of performance incentives as shown by Figlio and Winicky (2005) but we do not …nd any evidence for gaming.
Latest research also focuses on social distance and interaction of incentives. Kingdon and Rawal (2010) show that a student's achievement in a subject in which the teacher shares the child's gender, caste and religion, is on average nearly a quarter of a standard deviation higher than the same child's achievement in a subject taught by a teacher who does not share the child's gender, caste or religion. However, Berg et al. (2013) …nd experimental evidence to suggest that incentive pay does not improve the transmission of knowledge with respect to households of similar characteristics as the agent but it does improve transmission with respect to socially distant households. Our results reveal that incentive pay interacts with improving health of boys more than girls. Similarly, a child is more likely to show signi…cant gains in weight if the high-powered incentivized worker and the child's mother follow the same religion as compared to them following di¤erent religions. 5 Theoretically, under risk neutrality, there is no di¤erence between absolute and relative incentives (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) . With risk aversion and common shocks, relative incentives can dominate absolute incentives (Green and Stokey, 1983 ). The reason is that relative pay …lters the common shock making agents face lower risk as compared to absolute pay. Under the relative incentive scheme, workers' pay depends on the ratio of individual productivity to average productivity among all co-workers in a …eld. Recent experimental evidence by Gangadharan et al. (2013) suggests that an endogenous-prize tournament leads to a Pareto improvement in participants' 5 The caste of workers and mothers was not collected in this study.
payo¤s and also increases collective output. Under the absolute incentive scheme -piece rates -individual pay only depends on individual productivity. Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2004) …nd that moving from relative to absolute incentives increases the productivity of a farm worker by 50%. In the public sector, there has been no such empirical study comparing relative and absolute incentives. This may matter because of several reasons. First, shocks to output may be salient. Second, output may be less easily observable. Third, output may not directly respond to an increase in e¤ort (may depend on demand-side also). Fourth, public sector workers may be more risk averse (Buurman et al., 2012) . Fifth, workers may be di¤erently motivated (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) and may exert more e¤ort in response to non-…nancial awards as shown by Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack (2012). We motivate the treatments by proving that the costs associated with the absolute scheme are always greater than the relative scheme when a common shock is possible and public sector agents are risk-averse. We delineate the theoretical framework in Section 2, the setting in Section 3, and treatment, methodology and empirical speci…cation in Sections 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Section 7 reports the results and Section 8 provides policy implications and concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Assume one risk neutral principal (the government) and n risk averse agents (center workers), each responsible for producing output. In our scenario, the output could mean healthier (and less malnourished) children. Each agent exerts an e¤ort and receives a wage from the principal. The agents'e¤orts are not visible to the principal, and therefore the principal can only contract based on the agents'output levels. For simplicity, we assume that the agents' e¤ort levels are discrete, namely 0, 1, and 2. Agents produce two levels of outputs: 0 or 1. The probability of attaining the high output depends on the agents'e¤ort level: the higher the agent's e¤ort, the higher her chance for producing 1 as opposed to 0.
We also assume a common shock in production. This could be thought of as a shock that causes output to shrink for all workers and is outside their control. In our setting, this could represent the onset of a disease (for example, malaria especially during the rainy season). With probability , all the agents produce 0 regardless of their e¤ort level. The agents'utility function is given as follows:
Here, w is the wage this agent receives, c is the multiplier of the disutility caused by the agents' e¤ort and x is the agents' e¤ort level. Agents are assumed to be risk averse, thus V is an increasing and concave in w.
The principal's utility function is as follows:
w i p i is the output level for agent i, n is the number of the agents, M is the multiplier for the agents'outputs. 6 Moreover, it is always worthwhile for the principal to engage the agents in the highest level of e¤ort (x = 2). Thus, the products are su¢ ciently valuable to the principal, i.e. M is su¢ ciently large. We now turn our attention to the two cases under consideration: …rst, the cost to the principal for implementing an absolute performance pay scheme and second, for a relative performance scheme.
Cost for an Absolute Performance Pay Scheme
Suppose the wage for the agent is a for output = 0, and b for output = 1. Clearly b > a. The expected utility for agents with each of the di¤erent e¤ort levels is:
To implement the highest e¤ort level, the principal needs to make sure that the agent's utility with highest level of e¤ort (x = 2) is the greatest in comparison to the other two e¤ort levels. This boils down to the following condition:
Thus, the di¤erence between the utilities generated by the high wage and the low wage should be large enough. The principal could achieve this by lowering a. However, practically, there is a lower bound on a: If an agent produces 0, the principal needs to make sure that the agent can survive on her wage. This condition is particularly relevant in the public sector, where workers are di¢ cult to …re and where unionization resists cutting down on wages of unproductive workers. We can suppose that V (a) > U . It follows that V (b) > 3c 1 + U . The total cost for the principal to implement a high e¤ort for all agents under the absolute performance pay is as follows:
Cost for a Relative Performance Pay Scheme
When there are n agents, a complete relative performance pay scheme should have n + 1 contingencies, which boils down to 2 (n 1) + 2 = 2n number of payments. For example, in a three agents case, a complete tournament scheme would need to specify payments for output combinations (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), which contains six kinds of pay. Denoting the pay structure (H 0; L 0 ; H 1; L 1; :::; H n; L n ); H corresponds to pay on high output, and L corresponds to low output pay. The subscript n on L n and H n corresponds to the number of agents who produce low output. When all agents produce the same output -be it 1 or 0 -the relative rank for each agent is the same. For example, if there is a common shock, output will be low for all agents and all of them will receive L n : On the other hand, if everyone exerts high e¤ort and there is no common shock, the output will be high and all agents will receive H 0 : As the rank structure is exactly the same in both cases, all workers should receive the same wage under a relative scheme: H 0 = L n .
For our purposes, we only need to compute the cost for the principal to make e¤ort level portfolio (2, 2, 2,..., 2) a Nash Equilibrium. In this case, we only need to examine whether there is an incentive for an agent to choose 0 or 1 over 2, provided everyone else chooses 2. Therefore only three kinds of payments are relevant. H 0 ; L n ;and L 1 : Note that from our previous assumptions,
Assuming that (n 1) agents have already chosen e¤ort level of 2, the expected utilities of the n th agent to choose 0, 1, 2 are respectively:
The inequality that arises out of solving the above problem along with the minimum utility assumption leads to V (T ) > U + 3c. The minimized total cost for a principal using tournament is
Comparison between absolute and relative schemes
The di¤erence between the two cost functions is as follows:
Notice the di¤erence is actually 0 when = 0. To see how this di¤erence varies with ; we take its derivative with respect to . We can prove that when V (w) is concave:
The cost for an absolute scheme is higher than that for a relative scheme whenever common shock is possible. This result is in contrast to the stylized one in the current literature, which states that the absolute scheme should dominate the relative schemes when the probability of common shock is low enough or when it is not present (Green and Stokey, 1983) . The "public sector assumption" that assumes that agents should obtain a minimum level of utility even when they perform poorly leads to the principal optimally choosing a more cost e¤ective relative scheme for extracting high e¤ort from its agents.
Setting
There are 1.31 million day care centers across India that o¤er child care and nutritional counseling services. These are run by the government under the umbrella of Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) through the Social Welfare Department. Each center is usually sta¤ed by one government worker and an assistant. Workers can a¤ect health of the child through two primary channels: …rst, providing mid-day meals to children and second, advising mothers on a nutritious diet. We study child care workers employed by the West Bengal government in Maheshtala Municipality in 24 South Pariganas District. Maheshtala is located in the Kolkata Metropolitan Region. According to the 2011 Indian census, the population of Maheshtala was 449,423. The sex ratio of Maheshtala city was 945 females per 1000 males. Average literacy rate of Maheshtala was 82.63 percent of which male and female literacy was 86.08 and 78.98 percent. Children constituted 9.67 % of the total population of Maheshtala. We were able to carry out this study in Maheshtala as the Social Welfare Department was keen to implement an experiment to tackle malnutrition. Moreover, Maheshtala happens to be understudied and has malnutrition comparable to slum areas in the Chandigarh experiment analyzed in Singh (2012) . Here, the worker in a day care center has a …xed monthly salary of Rs. 4350 in Kolkata, which increases to Rs. 4413 after 10 years of service. All workers in this Municipality have similar tasks and operate under the ICDS scheme. Education, knowledge and experience of worker along with quality of infrastructure in the centers are controlled for in regressions below.
Treatment
There were three treatments that were implemented in the research project. All three treatments entailed free distribution of recipe books to all mothers apart from performance pay to workers. This was done because the combined treatment of incentives and information in Singh (2012) had been shown to increase weight in children and only incentives to workers or only recipes to mothers were individually ine¤ective. The recipe book is described later in the section. To understand each of the performance pay treatments, consider the categories established by WHO (2007) , as these are also employed by the government workers. A child is classi…ed as malnourished if she is more than two standard deviations away from her WHO standard weight-for-age mean. 9 She is moderately malnourished if she is more than two standard deviations but less than three standard deviations from the weight-for-age mean. A child is severely malnourished if she is more than 3 standard deviations away from the weight-for-age mean.
The …rst treatment, titled Basic Absolute (BA treatment), was the replication of the combined treatment from Singh (2012), which had reduced malnutrition by 4.2 percent over three months. This entailed Rs. 100 per child if the child's malnutrition grade improved from severe to moderate or moderate to normal and a corresponding Rs. 100 deduction from the total for a drop in grade from normal to moderate or moderate to severe. In other words, if: N for each worker = # children who jump at least one grade -# children who drop at least one grade
The total payment promised for each worker was Rs. 100 * N after three months. 10 From the earlier experiment, it was not clear how the slope of performance pay was related to e¤ort. In the second treatment, called High Absolute (HA treatment), the payout promised to the workers after three months was Rs. 200 * N, where N was de…ned in the same way. However, if more children su¤ered declines as opposed to increases in grades, the workers were not responsible for any payments. As the schemes were implemented 9 The standard also di¤ers for males and females. 10 Approximately, 1 US$ = Rs. 60 in July, 2013. in the presence of senior sta¤ and under the signed approval of the local Director of Social Welfare Department, the promises could be seen as credible commitments to the workers. For example, if the number of children who jump from severe to moderate = 4 and the number of children who drop from normal to moderate = 2, the total payment would be Rs. (4-2) * 100 = Rs. 200 in the BA treatment and Rs. 400 in the HA treatment.
The average payout in Chandigarh for the basic absolute incentive with recipe book had been Rs. 291 per worker but the monthly worker salary was Rs. 2000 per month in 2010. Since the workers' salary was almost twice in Maheshtala as compared to Chandigarh, the high absolute treatment can also be considered a test of the previous experiment's treatment if the slope is considered to be a proportion of the salary. Thus, the …rst two treatments can also throw light on the relative e¤ectiveness of a constant slope of Rs. 100 versus the same slope as a proportion of total income.
The third treatment, or the basic relative (BR treatment), was allocated a pot of money containing on average Rs. 291 per worker to keep it consistent with the ex-ante expected payout in the basic absolute treatment.
T for each worker = sum of all positive N in that treatment group Payout = 55 workers * 291 * (N/T) = 16000 (N/T)
The total amount for 55 workers would be approximately Rs. 16000. However, the payout to each worker would depend upon her performance relative to others in the group. For example, if the worker's N = 10 and the sum of all positive N = 100 in her treatment group of 55 workers, the worker would get 10 percent of the total amount = Rs. 1600. If each worker performs equally, they each get approximately Rs. 300 in the basic relative treatment. 11 The relative treatment is also similar to Bandiera et al. (2004) , where the workers'pay depended on the ratio of individual productivity to average productivity among all co-workers in a …eld.
11 These wards were numbered 1, 10, 14, 18, 22, 25, 29, 30. Workers in each treatment group participated in three separate workshops at the end of the baseline round (one for each treatment), where they were handed goal cards. The goal cards listed target weight for each child in their center after three months. Goal was the threshold for achieving moderate malnutrition status for the presently severely malnourished child (after accounting for the increase in age at endline) and achieving normal malnutrition status if the child is currently moderately malnourished. If the child was currently in the normal range, a maximum threshold was provided below which the child would become malnourished and penalty imposed. The workers were told about their respective treatments with the help of illustrative examples and all doubts were clari…ed.
The recipe book that was distributed in all treatments had ten economical and nutritious recipes for 3-6 year old children. These were government approved recipes and the recipes were chosen with the help of the Food and Nutrition Board, Kolkata. Each recipe could be made within a budget of Rs. 5 at home, contained local ingredients and listed the step-by-step method of preparation and nutritive values per 100 gms. The individual nutritive values were of calories, protein, iron and carotene. The book was translated and printed in Bengali, the local language. Some of the recipes were as follows: Pu¤ed Rice Bengal Gram Mix, Rice Food Mix, Suji Porridge, Dalia Porridge, Chidwa Pulao and Chidwa Laddoo. These were rich in protein and calories to counter child malnutrition. Most used either lentils for increasing protein and rice, wheat or jaggery for increasing calorie count.
Methodology
After receiving approval and preliminary data from the Social Welfare Department, Government of West Bengal on the number of registered students and average malnutrition in each center, manual randomization at the cluster level was conducted at the Department by a lottery. Each cluster was made up of several centers. All centers with fewer than 20 registered students were dropped from the sample. Out of 35 clusters in the Municipality, one of clusters (number 28) did not have any centers with 20 or more students registered at the time. In total, 34 clusters were selected for the study covering 209 centers. The senior department o¢ cials (supervisors) asked to be involved in the selection procedure, so they were invited to participate in the lottery.
Four boxes were placed in the Department's head o¢ ce, each corresponding to an undisclosed treatment or control group. The supervisors placed a folded slip (representing the cluster number and total centers in that cluster) inside each box sequentially. When the total number of centers accumulated for a treatment exceeded 50, the assistant was asked to shut the box. This was done to have at least 50 centers in each group for adequate sample size according to power calculations. This would also avoid the exceptional case where the wards with the highest or fewest number of centers get assigned to one treatment by chance. Cluster was chosen as the level to randomize to remove the possibility of contaminating spillover e¤ects between workers within a cluster. Table 1 shows the total clusters and centers allocated to each group and Figure 1 plots the assignment on a map provided by the Department. <Table 1 and Figure 1 about here> The baseline was carried out during March-May, 2012 and the endline three months later between August-September, 2012. A window of three months was chosen for the experiment because it is the average time between two medical check-ups by the local Health Department. The duration was veri…ed to be su¢ cient for a grade improvement to occur by doctors at the local o¢ ce of the Health Department, Government of India and was comparable to the earlier experiment. At baseline and endline, a team of enumerators (supervised by an assistant and project manager) weighed all children present in the center on a digital weighing machine, interviewed their mothers and the center workers. The recipe books were distributed to all the mothers (except in the control group) after their interviews were taken at the centers. Previous weights of children (on average two months prior to baseline) were also recorded at baseline from the weight record registers of the workers.
Empirical Speci…cation
The main regression speci…cation for …nding the average e¤ect of the treatments on weight of a child is as follows:
w ijt is the weight of a child i in cluster j at time t. The variable post is a dummy that is 0 for baseline and 1 for endline. The variables BA; HA and BR are 1 if the child is in the treatment basic absolute, high absolute or basic relative respectively and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is the control group. X ijt are individual and center speci…c controls speci…ed in the following section. The error term is clustered at the cluster level. The variable post accounts for the natural increase in weight in three months, all seasonal e¤ects on weight, regional shocks to food prices and any management changes or unobservables that would impact all groups in the same way. ;
and are the baseline di¤erences between the individual treatments and the control. ; and ! give us the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for the e¤ect of each of the three treatments. This interpretation rests on the identi…cation assumption that there are no time varying and group-speci…c e¤ects that are correlated with the treatments (common trend assumption). As the clusters were randomly assigned into one of the four groups, we should not expect there to be common trends amongst the groups.
Although usually it is not required to check this assumption with randomization, we carry out a placebo check to corroborate that pre-trends are similar across all groups. For the placebo check, we de…ne post = 1 for baseline and 0 for the weight recorded in registers prior to baseline (on average about two months before). Running the above regression with this new de…ni-tion should allow us to test if there are changes in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates from what we had obtained earlier. We should not observe any signi…cant di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates with the placebo regression for common pre-trends assumption to hold.
Results
The summary statistics at baseline in Table 2 reveal that mother's age is on average 27 years and is similar across the four groups.
12 73% of the mothers in the control group can read and this is also similar across groups, which is comparable to the 2011 Indian Census …nding of 78% literacy for women in Maheshtala. The normalized di¤erences show that di¤erences between groups are not signi…cant as long as the normalized di¤erence is less than 0.25 (Imbens and Rubin, 2007). The literacy rate for women is particularly high in comparison to only 45% in Chandigarh. The weights and ages of children (around 13.5 kilograms and 4.2 years) as well as the malnutrition status are similar across all groups. The malnutrition rate is 33% at baseline with close to 9% being severely malnourished and the rest being moderately malnourished. The monthly income of a household (approximately $70) of four members (two adults and two children) is very similar to the data collected in Chandigarh, showing that families on average live below the poverty line in this sample. This is also statistically insigni…cant between the groups with HA group being the most similar to the control group along all variables. Ownership of mobile phones is high and water …lters is low similar to Chandigarh. The least similar group, overall, is the BA group where mobile phone ownership and presence of water tap at home is signi…cantly higher than the control. Anganwadi infrastructure as measured by presence of access to drinking water in the center or toilet in the center are also similar with close to 40% having a toilet and three quarters having drinking water. Thus, on average the variables appear to be well matched across groups with the HA group being the most similar to the control, followed by the BR group and then the HA group.
<Table 2 about here>
We might be worried about selective weighing of children in these groups despite checking by an independent supervisor and enumerator. Table 3 shows attrition rates. These are around 26% and similar across the four groups. Attrition rates tend to be higher in these centers as most students use the centers as a temporary pre-school before they gain admission to a government school. This is because the pre-school educational quality is poor with no o¢ cial syllabus or exams. As many of the fathers are daily wage laborers who are prone to migrating where a higher wage is o¤ered, their family also keeps moving with them. Attrition is not di¤erent by the main outcome variables depending upon treatment. This is illustrated by Appendix Table A2 where all coe¢ cients of the variable interacting treatments with main outcome variables (weight, malnourished, grade, severe malnourished) are insigni…cant. Stand-alone coe¢ cients on health outcomes and individual treatments are also insigni…cant (not shown).
<Table 3 about here>
The regression results from speci…cation (1) are reported in Table 4 for a panel of children who were weighed twice during the study. The depen-dent variables in the …rst four columns are weight, dummy for malnourished status, weight-for-age grade (ordered 0 to 2 from normal to severely malnourished) according to the WHO, and dummy for severely malnourished status. The results reveal that the weight increase in the control group over three months was on average 283 grams and signi…cant (similar to Chandigarh). The baseline levels of weight and other measures are similar in the four groups. There appears to be no signi…cant impact of the basic absolute (HA) and basic relative (BR) treatments. Moreover, BR appears to do slightly but insigni…cantly better than BA. The high absolute treatment shows a signi…cant e¤ect of an increase of 191 grams over and top of the 283 grams. Although malnutrition decrease is not signi…cant at the 10% level, there appears to be a 4.65% reduction just under the 10% signi…cance level. Relative risk of death from infection by malnutrition is twice as high for severely malnourished as for moderately malnourished children and nine times higher than normal weight children (Caul…eld et al., 2004). Moreover, more than half of all deaths in young children through diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria and measles are attributable to undernutrition (Caul…eld et al., 2004). Ordered grades decrease (as 0 is normal) on average in the HA treatment. The weight increase is driven by the movement towards moderate status of severely malnourished children as can be shown by column (4). Severe malnutrition declines by 4.88% and is signi…cant at the 5% level. The next four columns have the same dependent variables but also include control variables. The control variables used in columns (5)-(8) are age of child, gender of child, mother's age, monthly income, food expenditure, number of rooms, total siblings, mother's religion, whether the mother is a housewife, literacy of mother and father, quiz scores for workers and mothers, whether the worker is experienced or not, whether the worker is college educated or not, proportion of kitchen goods owned (out of refridgerator, water …lter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker), proportion of non-kitchen goods owned (out of mobile phone, television, scooter, radio and toilet) and dummy variables for the center's facilities (electricity, fan, helper, chart, blackboard, drinking water, and toilet). The preceding result on severe malnutrition is now more signi…cant and the decline in severe malnutrition is now estimated to be 6.3% for HA treatment. This is a big decrease given the time period and may be able to sustain itself after three months because of immunity and resistance acquired by moderately malnourished children. In Singh (2012), there was a similar reduction in overall malnutrition over three months (driven by more malnourished children), and malnutrition did not go back to its original level after a year when the incentive treatment was no longer in place. Next, we consider the placebo results wherein we look for differences in the rates of growth in children between the groups pre-treatment. This is shown in Appendix Table A1 . We observe that even on average two months prior to treatment, the weight increase was not di¤erent across the di¤erent treatment and control groups and they were on same trajectories. There may be measurement error here as the weights were recorded by the center workers in their registers but there is no reason to expect a systematic upward or downward bias in any of the treatment groups. Figure 2 shows the di¤erential trend in the high absolute treatment immediately after the treatment (located at two months) in comparison to the control group. The pre-baseline and baseline values are very similar in the high absolute and control groups. It is interesting to note that basic relative treatment appears to do better than the basic absolute treatment in the graph but the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant and neither is the di¤erence at baseline between these groups and the control group signi…cant. <Table 4 and Figure 2 about here> As high absolute treatment seems to be e¤ective in improving weights of children, we can conclude that slope of the incentive treatment as a proportion of salary matters in this context. In Appendix Table A3 , we reproduce the main regression using Moulton clustering correction (as opposed to the standard clustering) as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008) in situations where the main regressors (treatments) are …xed within a cluster and heteroskedasticity is not a huge problem. While all the coe¢ cients stay the same, the standard errors increase across the board, as expected, leading to a few changes in the degree of signi…cance of some coe¢ cients. Thus, the coe¢ cient Post*HA becomes insigni…cant in the weight regression, but it is still signi…cant at 5% and 10% in the grade and severely malnourished regressions, respectively. To better understand the channels, we would like to test if mothers report changes in diet at home in this treatment as this would lend more credence to the change in outcomes. In Table 5 , we explore the demand-side channel of mother-reported diet given to child. The dietary variables considered here are lentils or pulses, …sh, meat, green vegetables and sweets or desserts. Note that baseline levels of consumption are similar across all groups. Lentils or pulses intake (at least twice a week) shows a signi…cant increase in consumption and so does meat. Lentil intake is consistent with mothers being asked to prepare recipes by the HA treatment workers. Recall that several recipes (six out of ten) contained lentils as their main ingredient. This is rich in protein and would help lower protein de…ciency. There is no change in other types of dietary intakes for the HA group mothers. The mothers in the BA and BR group show no change in their reported food provision, which is again consistent with their results on weight change in Table 4 .
There could be exogenous factors that may cause certain mothers to be more intensely targeted with information by incentivized workers. As there were a large number of inter-religious interactions in this setting, we explore the role of religious homogeneity in the weight change. First, we classify a Hindu-Hindu or Muslim-Muslim mother-worker interaction as same religion. Then we run the health outcomes'speci…cation for same religion or di¤erent religion pairs. In Table 6 , we …nd that quality of communication may be better with same religion mother-worker pairs in the control group as there is a signi…cant increase in weight of 348 grams for these pairs but not for di¤erent religion pairs, consistent with Kingdon and Rawal (2010) . However, we also show that the increase in weight is high and signi…cant for same religion pairs as opposed to di¤erent religion pairs in the HA treatment. This may highlight a concern with provision of incentives in areas that have ethnic diversity. Incentives may crowd-out the worse outcomes generated by social distance (Berg et al., 2012 ), but we …nd that they can also accentuate outcomes, with incentivized workers only working to increase weights of children who are in the same social group. This may happen because of taste-based preferences or due to a lower cost of communicating with mothers e¤ectively but this is di¢ cult to disentangle with the data available. Another channel which appears to be important but cannot be tested is the provision of mid-day meals that may have increased for all children (reduction in leakage) or there may have been some substitution of food towards severely malnourished children. <Table 6 about here> Next, we explore heterogeneous e¤ects of the treatments by sex of child. In the Chandigarh experiment, there were no gender-di¤erential e¤ects of the incentive treatment. In Table 7 , we run a triple di¤erence regression to check for signi…cant di¤erences in average treatment e¤ects for boys and girls. Surprisingly, we …nd that boys show a much greater increase in the high absolute treatment relative to girls (345 grams higher and this is signi…cant at the 10% level). This reinforces the taste-based preferences channel that we observed earlier with same religious pairs as there may be an underlying gender bias that becomes more salient with the introduction of high absolute incentives. It may also be that boys have greater appetite or ask for more food in the centers and thus are able to get more food from the incentivized worker. Workers may expect that boys will show more weight gain in response to food in the center or that mothers will be less likely to cut down on food for boys leading to complementarity. However, this expectation may be incorrect, as we do not observe di¤erential food intakes reported at home for boys and girls suggesting that gender bias is getting triggered at the center and not at home. <Table 7 about here> Finally, we check for selective targeting of children who are close to the target threshold that may occur at the expense of those who are further away. The variable 'closetotarget'is de…ned to be 1 if the child is malnourished at baseline and her de…cit weight (di¤erence between the target weight and the actual weight) is less than the mean de…cit weight and 0 otherwise. Target weight is de…ned as the threshold at which the child will improve her grade (i.e. would go from severely malnourished to moderately malnourished or from moderately malnourished to not malnourished). If there was selective targeting of those children in the incentive treatments who are close to the target threshold, the disincentive for a drop in grade may not have been as e¤ective as anticipated. However, in Table 8 , we observe that children close to the threshold do not appear to be selectively targeted in any of the treatments. Children who are closer to the target weight do not increase their weight at a statistically di¤erent pace than the ones who are further away from their target, which provides evidence against gaming of positive incentives. This seems to reiterate the importance of having disincentives for worse outcomes along with incentives for better outcomes. 13 <Table 8 about here> 13 One may also be concerned about kids being given water by workers before the measurement of weights at endline. However, 'center has access to drinking water' is one of the controls used in the main regression, and this access is associated with an insigni…cant and negative increase in weight on average.
Policy implications and Conclusion
There has been no research in the public health sector in developing countries focusing on the elasticity of outcomes with respect to gradient of performance pay and also comparing absolute with relative treatments. We carry out a randomized controlled experiment to test three separate performance pay treatments in the public health sector. First, we exogenously change wages of government employed child care workers to a component with basic absolute incentives to lower child malnutrition. The second treatment introduces high absolute incentives. Finally, we also test for the impact of basic relative incentives on child health. All treatments also include supplying mothers with recipe books. Overall, the results suggest that high absolute incentive works to reduce severe malnutrition by about 6.3% with controls and 4.9% without controls over three months. This is a strong result and is in line with an earlier experiment carried out in Chandigarh in Singh (2012) that found a bene…t-cost ratio of around 20. As the government expands access to centers across the country, results from this paper suggest that worker pay should not remain …xed. Compensation needs to have a component of performance pay that increases as the …xed income goes up. The component should be based on weight-for-age grade that is easily observable and well understood. Additionally, the worker should not have perverse incentives to reduce weights of children who are not malnourished. Apart from incentivizing workers, it is also imperative to create awareness on the demand-side. One way of spreading this information is through simple and concise recipe books that are customized by regional tastes, availability of ingredients and social norms.
Possible channels that may be generating this high incentive e¤ect on weight include using recipe books to remind mothers to increase protein intake at home and also food distribution by worker in the center. Large increases in weight are observed in boys as opposed to girls, and same religion mother-worker pairs tend to be more productive in improving weight in the high absolute treatment than mother-worker pairs with di¤erent religions. This suggests that taste-based preferences may play a role even when workers are incentivized. In the future, we would also like to test the high relative treatment which we were unable to test here due to a small sample size. There could also be research on changing performance incentives along an observable dimension like gender.
The value of the funds released for ICDS by the central government in 2011-2012 was, for West Bengal, equal to $193.6 million. If the state-allocated funds are included, this …gure goes up to $221.5 million. A large proportion of these funds go towards …xed wages of child care workers. Yet, little is known about the most e¤ective way of organizing labor contracts in this important area of public sector service. We need to have a better handle at understanding what nudges work to motivate child care workers and reduce malnutrition rates, which have remained stagnant in India despite economic growth. Di¤erent settings within India can pose very di¤erent challenges, but one advantage of working within the same public organization can be easier replicability. We hope that further experimentation in this area can inform policy-makers how to make public health service delivery more e¢ cient. Note: The control variables used in this regression are: age of child, gender of child, mother's age, monthly income, food expenditure, number of rooms, total siblings, mother's religion, whether the mother is a housewife, literacy of mother and father, quiz scores for workers and mothers, whether the worker is experienced or not, whether the worker is highly educated or not, proportion of goods in the kitchen, proportion of nonkitchen goods, and dummy variables for the center's facilities (electricity, fan, helper, chart, blackboard, drinking water, and toilet). Robust standard errors are clustered at the cluster level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Gender = 1 if girl and 0 if boy. The control variables used in this regression are: age of child, gender of child, mother's age, monthly income, food expenditure, number of rooms, total siblings, mother's religion, whether the mother is a housewife, literacy of mother and father, quiz scores for workers and mothers, whether the worker is experienced or not, whether the worker is highly educated or not, proportion of goods in the kitchen, proportion of nonkitchen goods, and dummy variables for the center's facilities (electricity, fan, helper, chart, blackboard, drinking water, and toilet). Robust standard errors are clustered at the cluster level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Oher variables included in this regression are health outcome variables on their own and treatments on their own. The control variables used in this regression are: age of child, gender of child, mother's age, monthly income, food expenditure, number of rooms, total siblings, mother's religion, whether the mother is a housewife, literacy of mother and father, quiz scores for workers and mothers, whether the worker is experienced or not, whether the worker is highly educated or not, proportion of goods in the kitchen, proportion of nonkitchen goods, and dummy variables for the center's facilities (electricity, fan, helper, chart, blackboard, drinking water, and toilet). The attrition variable takes value 1 if that child his or her weight is unavailable in the second round, and 0 otherwise. Note: The control variables used in this regression are: age of child, gender of child, mother's age, monthly income, food expenditure, number of rooms, total siblings, mother's religion, whether the mother is a housewife, literacy of mother and father, quiz scores for workers and mothers, whether the worker is experienced or not, whether the worker is highly educated or not, proportion of goods in the kitchen, proportion of nonkitchen goods, and dummy variables for the center's facilities (electricity, fan, helper, chart, blackboard, drinking water, and toilet). Moulton correction for the standard errors is used in this table. Moulton (1986) implements an OLS standard error correction for clustering. Moulton factors are estimated from the data and used to scale the conventional OLS standard errors. The error term is assumed to have a cluster specific and an observation specific component and that both of these components are homoscedastic.
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Theory
In the absolute performance pay case: In the relative performance pay case: To make 2 a best response, it is necessary that:
which implies that
Notice this condition dominates the …rst one. Similarly, we assume that in the worst case scenario, the agent should also attain the same minimum utility level U . This means that:
The cost is minimized when ( ) holds, i.e., when V (L 1 ) = U V (T ) 1
: Plug it in ( ), it follows that:
(1 )V (T ) U + V (T ) > 3c:
Notice the di¤erence is actually 0 when = 0. To see how this di¤er-ence varies with ; we take its derivative about . For convenience, suppose V 1 (x) = h(x): Since V (x) is concave and increasing, its inverse function h(x) is convex and increasing.
(C absolute C relative ) 0 = n(h(U ) h(
. Since h(x) is a continuous function on its domain, by Mean Value Theorem, it follows that
where U 2 (U; 3c 1 + U )
Plug it back in, it follows that:
Notice that 3c 1 + U > U Since h(x) is convex, it follows that
and therefore (C absolute C relative ) 0 > 0 Now that C absolute C relative = 0 for = 0; then C absolute > C relative for > 0.
To put it another way, the cost for an absolute scheme is higher than that for a relative scheme whenever common shock is present. This result is not the same as those in the current literatures, which state that the absolute scheme should dominate the relative schemes when the common shock level is low, or at least when common shock is not present. This result is caused by the "public sector assumption", which assumes that agents should obtain a minimum level of utility even when they perform badly.
